The tool your business uses to manage laptops and phones, whether that's Microsoft Intune, Google's device management, Jamf or another MDM, can erase every one of those devices with a single command. If one admin login is stolen, whoever stole it gets that power too. Our advice is simple to say and only a little harder to do: keep the group of people who hold that power small, make them sign in with a method that can't be phished, and require a second admin to approve any wipe.

That's the lesson from what happened to Stryker last week. Here's what is known, why it matters to a small clinic or accounting office, and a short review you can run this week.

What happened at Stryker, and why no malware was needed

On March 11, 2026, Stryker identified a cybersecurity incident that caused a global disruption to its Microsoft environment. Stryker is a large medical technology company with a global workforce. Stryker described a severe, global disruption affecting all of its laptops and systems that connect to its network, and the logo of Handala, a hacking group linked to Iran, appeared on company login pages. Stryker hasn't confirmed who was behind it.

The detail that should get a business owner's attention is in the company's own SEC filing: the company said it had no indication of ransomware or malware and believed the incident was contained. Stryker later stressed that the threat actor did not deploy any malware on its systems.

So how do you wipe a company's devices without malware? You use the company's own tools. Stryker has not said publicly how the attackers got in. But a source familiar with the incident told BleepingComputer that the attackers used a new Global Administrator account created after compromising an administrator account. Read that as an unconfirmed report. It is still a very plausible way this kind of attack happens.

There's a detail that is easy to miss: staff were told to remove corporate management and applications from their personal devices, including the Intune Company Portal, Teams and VPN clients. When personal phones are enrolled in a company's management tool, those phones can be affected too.

On March 18, 2026, CISA said it was aware of malicious cyber activity targeting endpoint management systems of U.S. organizations, based on the March 11, 2026 cyberattack against Stryker Corporation. CISA said it is coordinating with federal partners, including the FBI.

Heads up

Your antivirus and your email filter won't stop this attack. Nothing malicious runs on the laptops. The wipe is a legitimate command sent through a legitimate admin tool by someone using a legitimate (stolen) admin login.

Your device-management console is a master key (Intune, Google, Jamf, MDM)

There are good reasons to use device management. A laptop gets left in an Uber, an employee quits with the office iPad, a phone with patient texts goes missing at the beach. Remote wipe is the feature that makes those days survivable.

The same feature works just as well for an attacker. Microsoft says Entra ID roles with access to Intune, such as Global Administrator and Intune Administrator, are privileged roles with broad permissions in Intune. In plain terms, anyone holding one of those roles can usually push software, run scripts and wipe devices across the whole company.

CISA said the principles of its recommendations can be applied to Intune and, more broadly, to other endpoint management software. If your office runs Google Workspace device management, Jamf for Macs, or an MDM your IT provider manages for you, the same questions apply.

Why small businesses are more exposed, not less

People assume a big company with a big security team is harder to hit, and usually it is. In a small business, the risk tends to pile up in a few predictable places:

None of these are unusual. In our experience, it's common to find several of them in the same office.

CISA's three fixes: fewer admins, phishing-resistant MFA, two-person approval

CISA's endpoint management alert urges organizations to harden their endpoint management system configurations. For a small business, it comes down to three controls.

1. Fewer admins, smaller roles

CISA says to use the principle of least privilege when designing administrative roles, and to use Intune's role-based access control (RBAC) to give each role only the minimum permissions it needs for day-to-day work. Microsoft describes RBAC the same way: it lets teams handle daily operations with the minimum set of permissions required.

What that means for you: the person who enrolls new laptops doesn't need the power to wipe all of them. Your help-desk vendor doesn't need Global Admin to reset a password. Microsoft also advises adopting time-bound privilege elevation, such as Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM). CISA urged organizations to use least-privilege principles when designing administrative roles and to use Intune role-based access control to give each role only the minimum permissions needed for day-to-day operations. Check which license you have before planning around time-bound access.

2. Phishing-resistant MFA for every admin

CISA urges enforcing phishing-resistant MFA and privileged access hygiene. Microsoft says every privileged Intune action, including device wipe, should require strong, policy-verified sign-in rather than just a password, and recommends moving privileged accounts to phishing-resistant authentication methods.

It helps to know what counts as phishing-resistant. According to the documentation on authentication strengths, the built-in phishing-resistant MFA strength allows combinations of Windows Hello for Business or platform credential, FIDO2 security key, and Microsoft Entra certificate-based authentication (multifactor). For a small office, we'd usually recommend a hardware security key on each admin's keychain.

If you can't get there this week, there's a stopgap. CISA's earlier MFA guidance says number matching isn't as strong as phishing-resistant MFA, but is one of the best interim steps for organizations that can't implement phishing-resistant MFA right away.

Microsoft also recommends Conditional Access policies dedicated to privileged roles and admin portals that require phishing-resistant authentication only. Keep in mind that Conditional Access requires a Microsoft Entra ID P1 license.

3. Two-person approval for wipes

This is the control that would have made one stolen login far less damaging. CISA recommends policies that require a second administrative account's approval for sensitive or high-impact actions such as device wiping. Intune calls this Multi Admin Approval: selected Intune changes need a second authorized admin to review and approve them before they deploy. Consider requiring a second approval for high-impact Intune workflows.

For a small office, the second approver can be the owner, a partner, or a named person at your IT provider. The point is that one compromised account can no longer erase the company alone.

Put both of them on hardware security keys, and don't let one person hold both accounts. :::

What it costs

Many small businesses already pay for the licensing. Microsoft lists Intune Plan 1 as included in Microsoft 365 E3, E5 and EMS E3/E5, or available standalone at $8.00 per user per month (Microsoft Intune pricing). Conditional Access needs Entra ID P1, so confirm which plan you're on before you assume a feature is available. The other real costs are a security key for each admin and an afternoon of your IT provider's time.

ControlWhat it stopsLicensing to checkEffort for a small office
Least-privilege rolesOne login holding every powerYour Intune licenseA few hours to map and reassign
Phishing-resistant MFA for adminsStolen passwords and phished push codesEntra ID P1 for Conditional AccessSecurity keys plus a setup session
Multi Admin Approval for wipesOne stolen account wiping everythingIntuneUnder an hour to configure and test
Time-bound admin (PIM)Standing admin access sitting idleHigher Entra tierOptional, plan for later

A 30-minute admin-access review for a 10-50 person company

You can do this yourself with your IT provider on a screen share. Block out some time and go through it in order.

First: List who holds the keys.

  1. Ask your IT provider for a list of every account with Global Administrator, Intune Administrator or any custom Intune role. In Google Workspace, ask for super admins and anyone with device-management rights. In Jamf, ask for full-access users.
  2. Next to each name, write who it is and why they need it.
  3. Flag any shared account, any former employee or vendor, and any admin account that is also someone's daily email login.

Next: Check how they sign in.

  1. For each admin, find out what MFA method they use: text, app push, number matching, or a security key.
  2. Find out whether your platform has a sign-in policy that applies to admin sign-ins.
  3. Ask whether there are emergency "break glass" accounts, where their credentials are kept, and who knows they exist.

Last: Check who can wipe.

  1. Ask: "If one of these accounts were stolen tonight, could it wipe every device without anyone else approving?" If the answer is yes, that's your top priority.
  2. Confirm whether two-person approval is on for device wipes and for changes to admin roles.
  3. Write down three dated action items. The usual ones: cut the admin list, put admins on security keys, turn on two-person approval.
Tip

Separate admin accounts from daily accounts. Your admin login should never read email or browse the web. Keeping them apart makes an admin password much harder to phish.

Worked example

Hypothetical: A 22-person physical therapy practice with three clinics in Orange County runs Microsoft 365 with Intune. The review finds five Global Admins: the owner (who uses that login for everything), the office manager, two technicians at their managed IT provider sharing one login, and a former IT company nobody removed. Every admin uses push-notification MFA, and any one of them can wipe all 30 laptops and tablets on their own.

After the review, the practice keeps two Global Admin accounts (the owner's new admin-only account and one named account per technician at the IT provider, each tied to its own person), downgrades the office manager to a narrow help-desk role, and deletes the old vendor's account. All admins get hardware security keys, a Conditional Access policy requires them for admin portals, and Multi Admin Approval is turned on so any wipe needs the owner and a technician to agree. Lost-laptop wipes still work, they just need a second click from a second person.

Pitfalls we see

Testing your own admin accounts before an attacker does

A checklist tells you what should be true. Testing tells you what is true. We'd test whether an admin password can be reused anywhere, whether MFA can be bypassed or fatigued, whether a help-desk role can quietly promote itself, and whether a wipe request really stops and waits for a second approver.

That's the kind of work our pentesting automation service is built for. It runs repeatable checks against your identity and device-management setup and writes the results up in plain English. If you'd rather start with a conversation about where your risk sits, our AI and security consultation covers that in one session. We work with offices across Southern California, and you can see examples of our security tooling in the Mal-Mon case study.

What we'd do in your office

  1. Run the review above with you and your IT provider.
  2. Trim admin roles to as few as you can work with, each tied to a named person.
  3. Move every admin to hardware security keys behind a Conditional Access policy.
  4. Turn on Multi Admin Approval for wipes and admin-role changes, then test it with a harmless request.
  5. Re-test every quarter and after any staff or vendor change.

Next step

Our takeaway: a single stolen login, holding too much power and with nobody else required to sign off, can do enormous damage without any malware. You don't need a big budget to close that gap. You need a short list of admins, strong sign-in for each of them, and a second person on every wipe.

Book a Free Automation Audit and we'll walk through your admin access with you and tell you where a single stolen login could do the most harm.

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